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In a Target store outside of Minneapolis, Minnesota, a father angrily
complained to a manager regarding baby coupons that the company mailed
to his home and addressed to his teenage daughter.2 After the store
manager initially apologized for the mailings, he called the father later that
week to once again express his regret for the mistake.3 Surprisingly, the
father made an apology of his own after learning his daughter was in fact
pregnant.4 Target knew to send the baby coupons to the pregnant teenager
based on its analysis of customer shopping patterns over time in search of
relationships between purchases that could indicate which consumers were
pregnant.5 The company was able to determine that pregnant consumers 
purchased certain combinations of items, like lotions, unscented soaps,
and dietary supplements, at different stages of their pregnancies.6 Target
1. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE ADVENTURES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 278
(1892). The quote famously notes the importance of data; Holmes is powerless to
make his stunning feats of deductive reasoning without data.
2. See Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant





5. To figure out whether a consumer is pregnant, Target analyzes purchases
of items that are needed for a new baby. Then, to determine if a woman is pregnant
earlier in time, models can be made based on the items purchased by people who
Target determines ultimately had babies before they bought distinctive baby
related items. Id.
6. Id.
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  279 4/26/21  8:53 AM










    
   






     
   
 
   
       
 
   
      
    
 
 
    
   
   
 
 
    
      
 
       
   
 
   
   
 
 
   
  
    
 
    
9512021] COMMENT
then used this information to send customers, like the man’s teenage
daughter, coupons for baby items to increase sales.7 
Like Target, modern businesses have discovered the value of data.8 
Data has evolved, increasing in both amount and complexity.9 To use the
analogy of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle from The Adventures of Sherlock
Holmes, companies have much more “clay,” or data, and are using it to
make “bricks,” or insight and information, that is increasingly valuable.10 
The Target anecdote illustrates how the retailer famously used its “clay”
to make bricks that enabled it to predict a teenager’s pregnancy before she
told her parents.11 Both consumer data, or data that companies collect on
consumers like the teen’s shopping habits, and industrial data, or data that
companies generate internally in the normal course of business operations,
have increased and become fundamental resources companies use to
generate revenue.12 Like a modern day gold rush, there has been a boom
of data “miners” using technological tools to discover valuable nuggets of
insight in an effort to deliver tremendous value to their companies.13 Ever-
7. Id.
8. See generally Lothar Determann, No One Owns Data, 70 HASTINGS L. J. 
3, 3–5 (2018).
9. Id.
10. DOYLE, supra note 1; see also Holger Hurtgen & Niko Mohr, Achieving
Business Impact with Data, MCKINSEY & CO. (Apr. 2018), https://www.mckinsey
.com/business-functions/mckinsey-analytics/our-insights/achieving-business-im
pact-with-data [https://perma.cc/WQ7V-Q5FV].
11. See Hill, supra note 2.
12. Alexander Furnas, Everything You Wanted to Know About Data Mining
but Were Afraid to Ask, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com
/technology/archive/2012/04/everything-you-wanted-to-know-about-data-mining-
but-were-afraid-to-ask/255388/ [https://perma.cc/4CKJ-R9GW]; Jeffery Ritter &
Anna Meyer, Regulating Data as Property: A New Construct for Moving Forward, 
16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 220, 253–54 (2018) (noting that the amount of total
“industrial data” grows by 40% each year).
13. In 1848, the discovery of gold in California sent many an aspiring miner
into the western hills, sparking the California Gold Rush. See The California Gold
Rush, PBS, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/goldrush-
california/ [https://perma.cc/FFE3-5R33] (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). The frenzy
of activity sent hundreds of thousands of people to California, and although over
$2 billion in gold was recovered, few of these prospectors ever struck it rich.
Within a decade, with most of the easily accessibly deposits depleted, the Rush
came to an end. California Gold Rush, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/topic/California-Gold-Rush [https://perma.cc/C5VW-8EAP]
(last visited Nov. 13, 2020). The revolution in data has often been likened to a new
gold rush, one where software, instead of pickaxes and shovels, are the tools of
choice to mine for valuable insights. Brad Peters, The Big Data Gold Rush, FORBES
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952 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
improving analytical techniques have allowed corporations to mine data
for information and trends, such as the connection between shopping
habits and pregnancy that Target discovered.14 Although data collection
and analysis present tremendous opportunities for businesses, they also
threaten to compromise consumer privacy.15 
Businesses cannot attain the value and opportunity that data collection
and analysis provide without impacts on consumers’ privacy.16 Concern
over consumer data collection methods, the scope of the data collected,
and companies’ use of the collected data have become prevalent issues.17 
Beyond the privacy implications of a business’s internal use of consumer
data, resourceful hackers and poor data governance18 have led to 
corporations’ increasingly common loss of consumer information in data 
breaches.19 A data breach’s severity can lead to significant data loss,
exposing the records of 100 million consumers or more per event, leaving 
them vulnerable to identity theft and other misappropriations of their
personal information.20 
Due to these concerns, governments across the world have taken
varying degrees of action to address the challenges that modern data
collection and use pose.21 The European Union recently enacted its most
comprehensive and stringent data privacy regulation yet: the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), which regulates how data collected on EU
(June 21, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradpeters/2012/06/21/the-big-
data-gold-rush/#2a42103ab247 [https://perma.cc/73F8-LTKU]. 
14. See Furnas, supra note 12.
15. See generally Daniel Marcus, The Data Breach Dilemma: Proactive
Solutions for Protecting Consumers’ Personal Information, 68 DUKE L. J. 555,
556–65 (2018).
16. Herb Weisbaum, The Total Cost of a Data Breach – Including Lost
Business – Keeps Growing, NBC NEWS (July 30, 2018), https://www.nbcnews
.com/business/consumer/total-cost-data-breach-including-lost-business-keeps-
growing-n895826 [https://perma.cc/C586-HN9K].
17. See generally Erika J. Nash, Notice and Consent: A Healthy Balance
Between Privacy and Innovation for Wearables, 33 BYU J. PUB. L. 197 (2018)
(discussing data collection with regard to wearable, connected devices).
18. Data governance is the “management of data availability, relevancy,
usability, integrity and security in an enterprise.” Data governance, IBM, 
https://www.ibm.com/analytics/data-governance [https://perma.cc/5C79-7WTM]
(last visited Nov. 13, 2020).
19. See generally Robert Rabin, Perspectives on Privacy, Data Security and
Tort Law, 6 DEPAUL L. REV. 313–19 (2017).
20. Id. 
21. See generally Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Towards a Global Data
Privacy Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365 (2019).
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9532021] COMMENT
citizens is processed, stored, and used.22 Alternatively, legislation in the
United States mostly takes the form of individual state regulations, except
for federal, sector-specific regulations such as the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).23 The most similar U.S.
regulation to the GDPR is California’s Consumer Privacy Act, which
became effective on January 1, 2020.24 Nationwide, the protection of data
privacy is not as uniform or protective of consumers as it is abroad, which
presents issues for consumers injured by the misuse of data.25 Consumers
have largely been unable to find relief in the aftermath of a data breach in
both federal and state courts.26 Federal courts are often unwilling to find
Article III standing27 after finding a lack of concrete and actual damages
following a breach.28 Similarly, state courts have found that the damages
element of a negligence claim is not satisfied for reasons regarding proof
of actual injury after a breach.29 Without overarching privacy regulation in 
the United States providing a cause of action for data misuse and
guidelines for good data governance, companies may continue to misuse
consumer data, while the injured consumers remain without relief.30 
Although much scholarly research on data protection has centered
around the merits and creation of an overarching U.S. data privacy
regulation like the GDPR, less authorship and more uncertainty surrounds
the foundation of data protection and claims.31 Lawsuits concerning data 
breaches are typically brought under privacy-based tort theories of
liability, but there is an open question as to whether data protection issues
22. Id. at 375–78.
23. HIPAA protects specific health data and does not prescribe a general data
protection regime outside of the healthcare field. See id. at 381.
24. Id. at 403–05.
25. Alex Bossone, The Battle Against Breaches: A Call for Modernizing
Federal Consumer Data Security Regulation, 69 FED. COMM. L. J. 227, 230 
(2018).
26. Id. at 228–29.
27. For a federal court to hear a case, the Supreme Court requires a party to
have a “concrete and particularized,” “actual or imminent” “injury in fact” to find
Article III standing. Standing is what the Constitution requires for a person to
bring a claim into, in this case, federal court. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U.S. 398, 409 (2016).
28. See Marcus, supra note 15, at 566–75.
29. Id.
30. See Jay Kesan & Carol Hayes, Liability for Data Injuries, 2019 U. ILL.
L. REV. 295, 333–39 (2019).
31. Marcus, supra note 15, at 566–75 (discussing the need for a uniform
privacy regulation).
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954 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
should be redressed in tort or another body of law such as property.32 The 
determination of this foundational question will impact the legal precepts
applicable to data breach claims, significantly affect the outcome of a
consumer’s claim in the event of a breach, and impact corporate practices 
with respect to data.33 Specifically, it must be decided, either judicially or 
legislatively, whether data privacy should be rooted in property law and 
whether data is susceptible of ownership.34 
Scholars have penned arguments both for and against property rights
in data.35 On one side of the argument, scholars favoring the treatment of
data as property argue that well-defined property rights in data are critical
to support the modern information economy, as businesses depend more
heavily on the data they collect and protect.36 These scholars further
recognize that in addition to the existing modes of property protection,
courts and Congress must create supplemental mechanisms to regulate the
complexity and amount of data property rights created if the law
recognizes data as an item of property.37 On the other side, scholars
advocating against treating data as property focus on the immense
complexity that a data property regime would entail and negative privacy
implications as evidence of data being practically untenable as property.38 
They further contend that the costs of increased litigation from consumers
asserting property rights to their data and the resulting impediment to
information flow would outweigh any minimal benefit that may otherwise
accrue.39 
Despite contrary positions on the issue, treating data as an item of
property can lay a foundation for any data privacy regulation in the United
States, particularly a much needed general federal regulation, and provide
clarity for courts to adjudicate data privacy disputes.40 In Louisiana, data
32. See Jay Kesan & Carol Hayes, Liability for Data Injuries, 2019 U. ILL.
L. REV. 295, 316, 323 (2019).
33. See generally id.
34. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12 (answering in the
affirmative). But see Determann, supra note 8 (answering in the negative).
35. See e.g., Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at 223; but see Determann, supra
note 8, at 34–37.
36. Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at 223.
37. Id. at 269–77.
38. See generally Determann, supra note 8, at 34–42.
39. Id.
40. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at 223.
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9552021] COMMENT
specifically merits classification as a corporeal movable,41 and not as an
intangible or incorporeal42 thing.43 To alleviate some of the issues, such as 
increased litigation that may accompany property rights in data,
companies collecting the data should have the largest “bundle of rights” in
the data, which would approximate ownership, or “quasi-ownership.”44 
This would allow the data-driven economy to function more efficiently
and potentially incentivize businesses to better protect their data from
external interference by hackers and other criminals as they might protect
other assets they own.45 Although this deprives consumers of an absolute
ownership right to “their” data, property rights, including ownership, are
rarely absolute.46 To protect consumers interests, courts or legislators must
also craft rules to limit the data collectors’ rights to exclude and transfer
the data or to provide a remedy if it is misused.47 
To effectively implement this data property regime, legislatures may
draw by analogy from the principles of mineral rights.48 Specifically,
applying the rule of capture and its attendant concepts, like the doctrine of
correlative rights, is instructive for assigning and limiting property rights
to data.49 From these precepts of mineral rights, a court would be able to
apply an existing property framework to novel data problems.50 
Additionally, either Congress or the state legislatures can draw on these
property concepts as the foundation for drafting a uniform data privacy
regulation in the future.51 
Part I of this Comment will introduce the concept of data as opposed
to information, as well as the modern uses and proliferation of data, and
will further describe the issues plaguing data use such as data breaches.
41. A corporeal moveable is what would be considered tangible personal
property in common law and is found in Louisiana Civil Code article 471. LA CIV.
CODE art. 471 (2020).
42. Incorporeals are intangible things such as rights and obligations on things.
Id. 
43. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at 223.
44. What is meant by “quasi-ownership” is rights approximating those of an
owner, even if not in relation to a traditional item of property that may typically
be owned. Id. at 267.
45. See generally id. at 223.
46. See generally Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and
Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 137–40 (2004).
47. See generally id.
48. See generally id. (noting that drawing on familiar property principles is
instructive in achieving balance, in that case, in interests in information).
49. For a discussion of these concepts, see infra Part IV.B.
50. See generally Lipton, supra note 46.
51. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at 223.
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956 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Part II will address the data protection methods that the European Union
and the United States have employed to address these issues and note
current problems with data protection in the United States. Part III will 
argue for the application of property principles to data and the
consideration of data as an item of property. Part IV will discuss how
courts and legislatures may implement this property regime by using the
mineral rights principles of the rule of capture and will then discuss the 
impact of such a regime. Ultimately, this Comment will conclude by
addressing the need for the judiciary to establish clearly defined data
property principles and call for the legislature to create a uniform data
privacy regulation.
I. “DATA! DATA! DATA!”
Data collection and exploitation by businesses have become
increasingly prevalent and pervasive parts of modern life.52 With a
digitally enabled and network-connected society whose technology is ever
expanding, the scope and resulting implications of data continue to
increase.53 Legal issues accompanying the rise of “big data” include the
manner in which data collectors may use the data and the appropriate
remedy in the event of a breach.54 Although usually synonymous, a
distinction between “data” and “information” is necessary to clearly
examine data and to analyze the legal regimes already in place.55 
A. Bricks or Clay?
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines data in a number of different
ways: first as “factual information . . . used as a basis for reasoning, 
discussion, or calculation,” then as “information in digital form that can
be transmitted or processed,” and finally as “information output . . . [that]
must be processed to be meaningful.”56 Although the definition of data
52. Terence Mills, Why Big Data and Machine Learning Are Important in 
Our Society, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbestechcouncil/2019/01/07/why-big-data-and-machine-learning-are-important
-in-our-society/#1332bf6f7aa2 [https://perma.cc/AE79-EHG5].
53. See generally Marcus, supra note 15, at 556–65.
54. See generally id.
55. Most scholarly articles on the subject of data also begin with an
explanation of the term before they begin their explication. See generally Ritter
& Meyer, supra note 12, at 225.
56. Data, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/data [https://perma.cc/8WG9-ZDRG] (last visited Nov. 13, 2020).
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9572021] COMMENT
includes the word “information,” the field of information systems makes
a meaningful distinction between data and information.57 Accordingly, 
this Comment differentiates between data on the one hand, and
information on the other.
In this Comment, “data” refers to the raw material, a fact, or a byte,
which, by itself, is meaningless to the average person.58 For instance, in
the Target example, archived records of each individual Stock Keeping
Unit (SKU)59 for each purchase constitute data. In contrast, “information”
is created by utilizing data to gain insight into a situation or problem.60 
Information represents the inferences and conclusions that have meaning
and value to the person who generated them, depending on the context
they are placed in.61 When Target compiles and transforms the individual
data points, or purchases, to create a shopping history for a single customer
or a trend in shopping patterns for multiple customers, such as the pregnant
customers in the Target example, the result of that analysis—the
identification of trends and the ultimate determination of which customers
are pregnant—then becomes valuable information for the retailer.
Scholars, and even data users, further distinguish between data that
has the ability to identify a consumer and data that does not identify a
consumer.62 Data that has the ability to identify a consumer is generally
termed “personally identifiable information,” or PII, and is of the most
notoriety and concern when discussing data protection issues.63 Data that
does not have the ability to identify a consumer is known by different
names, such as industrial data, and it generally describes data produced in
business operations or another area not connected to a consumer.64 This
57. The study of information systems is the study of systems which collect,
process, store, and distribute information, typically throughout an organization.
EFFY OZ, MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS 9–10 (2009).
58. Id.
59. A stock keeping unit is the number on an item’s barcode representing that
particular item. The code is derived relative to the price, product, and
manufacturer. See Stock Keeping Unit (SKU), INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 5, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stock-keeping-unit-sku.asp [https://perma
.cc/7KPW-CH9R]. The code itself or its numbers out of context are data;
however, in the right context and to the right people, it may provide information
about the item. This is in some ways an artificial distinction; however, it is
necessary to make sure that even the data, the code itself, may also receive
appropriate protection. Id.
60. OZ, supra note 57.
61. Id.
62. Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at 225.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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958 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Comment mainly focuses on consumer data, though the analysis proposed
is largely applicable to industrial data as well.
In a legal analysis of PII, scholars usually do not explicitly make such
a distinction between “data” and “information,” likely owing to the lack
of a definitive line between the two.65 Generally, scholars use the terms 
data and information interchangeably but recognize data as a less refined
subset of what the law traditionally recognizes as information.66 However,
the expectations regarding the legal protection available for each vary
based on the policies each implicates.67 For instance, at one end of the
spectrum, a creative expression or compilation of information may be
protected under intellectual property law with copyright, patent,
trademark, or trade secret protection.68 On the other end of the spectrum
are bare facts, or pure data, which, without more, are generally not
ownable or protectable.69 Thus, if closer to the expression-of-information
end of the spectrum, an item is more likely to obtain intellectual property
protections. Conversely, an item is generally less likely to implicate
intellectual property rights if it is closer to the data end of the spectrum.70 
The distinction between data and information is meaningful for
determining ownership and other property rights and affects the existing
legal precepts and regimes applicable to each.71 
B. Why Bricks or Why Clay?
Intellectual property law affords consumer data little protection due to
its dissimilarity with what is currently protected with patent, copyright,
65. See id. (defining data as information that is recorded); see also
Determann, supra note 8, at 6 (declining to make a distinction between data and
information although the author notes there are other approaches to the terms in
other academic disciplines).
66. See generally Determann, supra note 8, at 6 (claiming data is the
informational content of information).
67. Although many do not make a distinction in terminology, scholars do
discuss and recognize the differing principles that are applicable to what this
Comment refers to as data compared to information. See generally id. at 6–26.
68. Id. at 18–21 (discussing the ability of copyright to protect information
and data).
69. See generally Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234
(1918).
70. See generally Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(reasoning that because facts are not original, they may not be protected with
copyright, although factual compilations may be, while rejecting a copyright 
claim over the white pages of a local phone book).
71. See generally Determann, supra note 8, at 6–26.
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and other forms of intellectual property.72 Significantly, data lacks the 
creative or expressive elements inherent in protection under intellectual
property and thus may not be protected with intellectual property law.73 
Patents, copyrights, and trademarks protect certain uses of specific types
of information, or the particular expression of that information, that
Congress has decided to protect and promote for policy reasons.74 These
intellectual property devices provide the holder who has performed some
inventive or creative work a right to limit the public’s use of that
information to create an invention in patent, or copy an expression of
information in copyright.75 Congressional grants of rights under
intellectual property law seek to strike a balance between protecting the
inventor or artist’s creation and not overly infringing upon the public
domain of information that should remain open to everyone.76 This
balance motivates the restrictions of functionality in trademark law, the
limitation of copyright to an author’s expression, and the nonobvious
requirement in patent.77 
72. See generally id.
73. See generally id. at 14–21 (discussing what may be protected under trade
secret, copyright, trademark, and patent law).
74. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (stating what may be patented is “new and
useful”). Under patent, for example, in an effort to encourage innovation, an
inventor with an idea for an invention can secure the exclusive right to produce
that invention for a specified period. Id.
75. See 35 U.S.C § 271 (providing a cause of action for a patent holder against
one who infringes his patent). The ability to license patents, copyrights, and
trademarks encompasses a right to exclude others from using them as well.
However, this does not mean the information cannot be used at all, the public just
cannot use the patent information to create the patented invention, or directly copy
the expression of an author. Intellectual property does not generally protect the 
information itself. See generally Feist, 499 U.S. 340.
76. See generally Feist, 499 U.S. at 349–52 (discussing the fact/expression
dichotomy and noting others are encouraged to build freely upon the author’s
work, a result which is the purpose of the act).
77. For the nonobvious requirement in patent, see 35 U.S.C. § 103 (“A patent
for a claimed invention may not be obtained, . . . if the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention
pertains.”), and for the functionality requirement in trademark, see 15 U.S.C.
§1053(e)(5). Such limitations on intellectual property protection ensure that ideas
that were originally in the public domain, or obvious as in patent, are not removed
from public use by intellectual property protection.
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960 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Information that receives some benefit of intellectual property
protection is generally that which was creatively processed, transformed,
or has competitive value to an organization.78 In granting such protection,
legislatures determined that society’s interest in restricting the
unauthorized use of that information and rewarding the efforts of the
creator of the information outweighs the interest of allowing unfettered
use of that information or expression.79 Intellectual property does not
absolutely protect the underlying information, as its goal is to promote and
expand society’s body of knowledge.80 It does, however, limit certain uses
or practices of that information, such as limiting manufacture of a patented
invention, in order to promote invention, authorship, or another socially 
desirable goal.81 Intellectual property law does not prohibit the general
public’s use of bare facts, information, or ideas; thus, it would not
generally protect consumer data.82 
In International News Service v. Associated Press, the U.S. Supreme
Court discussed the extent to which intellectual property may provide
property rights in bare facts, equivalent to data, that are not traditionally
protected.83 The plaintiff news provider, Associated Press (AP), generated 
revenue by collecting facts for news stories and distributing articles for
newspapers to publish based on those bare facts collected.84 AP sued
another news provider, International News Service (INS), after it
discovered that the INS was waiting to get the facts from AP’s articles to
generate its own articles for subscribers rather than gathering the facts
themselves.85 In the case, the Court ultimately held that there was some
protectable “quasi-property interest” in the news despite the traditional
notion of the news as merely facts in the public domain.86 The Court found
that the underlying facts were not susceptible of ownership and 
distinguished them from the compilation of the facts into the news
articles.87 The Court reasoned that the underlying facts were insusceptible
78. See generally Determann, supra note 8, at 14–21.
79. Id. (discussing what may be protected under trade secret, copyright,
trademark and patent law).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See generally Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 349–52 
(1991).
83. See generally Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
84. Id. at 229.
85. Id.
86. See generally id. at 215.
87. Id. at 234.
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of ownership in the “absolute sense.”88 However, in the context of two
competitors compiling and selling the news, the news providers gathered
the facts at a cost and had to further transform the facts for the stories to
be distributed.89 Accordingly, it found that AP had obtained limited
property rights against INS in the facts it collected, rights that AP may not
otherwise have against the world.90 
The holding in International News Service demonstrates an
application of the concept of “relativity of title”91 applied to the “facts”
underlying the news.92 Facts, like data, may not generally be protectable,
but the decision to assign property rights, and to whom, may depend on
the relationship of the parties and the respective value of the item when
held by each.93 This will ultimately help justify, in part, property rights in
data.94 In his dissent in International News Service, Justice Brandeis was
reluctant to extend property rights to what amounted to facts traditionally
in the public domain.95 His reluctance to do so stemmed from his belief
that the imposition of property rights in facts, though cognizable, would
be best left to the legislature, which could better weigh societal interests 
and provide an appropriate framework for enforcement.96 Although the 
decision predated Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, this case remains heavily
referenced and illustrates the important distinction between protections on
the spectrum of information and data as well as the traditional approach to
such “data” or facts.97 Since 1918, when International News Service was 
decided, digital technology has dramatically shaped society and enabled




91. Relativity of title is an old common law notion that “title is not absolute
but a priority against another’s claim.” See Relativity of Title, BOUVIER LAW
DICTIONARY (2012). It recognizes that property rights are not absolute, but are
“enforceable only against particular individuals under certain circumstances.” Id.
92. See generally Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. 215.
93. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
94. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
95. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 264–67.
96. Id.
97. See generally id. This case was decided before the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which held that there is no general federal
common law. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Courts and scholars have continued to cite International News Service, even over
the last decade, and the analysis regarding property rights in facts is still
instructive in determining whether such property rights should be created in data.
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962 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
C. That’s a Lot of Clay
Many different sources generate and collect modern consumer data
daily.98 Consumer data may come from sources such as customer input in
web forms, browser cookies, credit card usage, and GPS locations.99 In
contrast, industrial data may be generated by sensors on a production line, 
in accounting transactions from point-of-sale systems at business-to-
business enterprises, and through numerous other business processes.100 
With the expansion of technology and the advent of new network-
connected devices such as the “Internet of Things”101 and autonomous 
vehicles,102 the amount of consumer and industrial data that corporations
collect and analyze has increased tremendously.103 
Many companies have realized the value gained through the
exploitation of data.104 One study recently estimated that major internet
platforms, such as Google, derived approximately $57 billion in revenue
from data analysis and transactions in 2018 alone.105 Sectors aside from
technology, like healthcare and finance, also generate significant value
98. Melody Ucros, 10 Sneaky Ways Companies Are Collecting Data to




100. Industrial Internet of Things, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, https://aws
.amazon.com/iot/solutions/industrial-iot/ [https://perma.cc/2PA7-2FYM] (last
visited Nov. 13, 2020).
101. The “Internet of Things” is a term used to describe devices that are 
connected to the internet, which are networked and generally contain sensors for
data collection. Watches, coffee pots, and televisions may now be connected to
the internet. See generally Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation Of ‘The Internet 
of Things’, FORBES (May 13, 2014, 12:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-
understand/#3a31cd871d09 [https://perma.cc/84SW-SAA3].
102. See ACCENTURE, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: THE RACE IS ON 5 (2018),
https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/pdf-73/accenture-autonomous-vehicles-
the-race-is-on.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB9J-V4Z7] (discussing the amount of data 
generated by a self-driving car).
103. Peters, supra note 13.
104. Determann, supra note 8, at 4 (describing data as the fuel of the digital
economy).
105. ROBERT SHAPIRO & SIDDHARTHA ANEJA, FUTURE MAJORITY, WHO OWNS 
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9632021] COMMENT
from data.106 To capture that value, organizations developed data mining 
techniques and software to gain insights about consumers from the data
that is constantly being collected about them.107 Companies perform
sophisticated analyses to find trends that predict customer behavior and to
discover patterns to improve financial metrics, such as revenue, and non-
financial metrics like customer satisfaction.108 As illustrated in the Target
anecdote, data as innocuous as a list of items purchased while shopping
can provide an opportunity for companies to pinpoint their advertisements
and seek greater revenue.109 Though now heavily used in many business’ 
operations, data and the proliferation in its collection and analysis have not
come without complications for consumers.
D. A Muddy Mess
In recent years, data transactions, which entail sales and transfers of
data, have been a point of concern for consumers and a key reporting area
for the media.110 Entire markets have emerged for data transactions,
particularly consumer data, through data brokers, on account of the value
that consumer data analysis can provide.111 Unlike large companies with
the resources to develop their own databases and data analysis techniques, 
small and midsize companies can use this intermediary market to tap into
the value of data.112 Brokers compile consumer data and sell it to 
companies, which, in turn, use the data to target advertisements and
marketing campaigns to a particular consumer based on his search history
and other data points, such as age and location.113 In 2018, American
106. Id.
107. Data Mining: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS, https://www.sas.com
/en_us/insights/analytics/data-mining.html [https://perma.cc/8F8A-ECJD] (last
visited Nov. 13, 2020).
108. Id.
109. See Hill, supra note 2.
110. Douglas MacMillan, How to Stop Companies from Selling Your Data,
WASHINGTON POST (June 24, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
2019/06/24/how-stop-companies-selling-your-data/ [https://perma.cc/PZW3-MG
BW].
111. Brian Naylor, Firms Are Buying, Sharing Your Online Info. What Can
You Do about It?, NPR (July 11, 2016, 4:51 PM), https://www.npr.org/sec
tions/alltechconsidered/2016/07/11/485571291/firms-are-buying-sharing-your-
online-info-what-can-you-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/VT6A-S5SU].
112. SHAPIRO & ANEJA, supra note 105.
113. Naylor, supra note 111.
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964 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
companies spent approximately $19 billion dollars obtaining data and new 
software for data analysis.114 
Data transfers that move consumer data outside the collecting
company pose risks to consumers’ data privacy.115 The most important
recent example of such data use outside of the collecting company is the
Facebook Cambridge Analytica Scandal.116 The scandal involved a third-
party researcher who provided hundreds of thousands of Facebook users’
profile data to a consulting company based in the United Kingdom, which 
allegedly then used the profile data to impact U.S. political elections.117 
Although Facebook maintains that it has never condoned the transfer of
information to such data intermediaries, the Federal Trade Commission
fined the company $5 billion dollars as part of a settlement agreement in
2019.118 In a recent suit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, the court, in ruling on Facebook’s motion to dismiss,
permitted a class of users to sue Facebook over the scandal.119 In so
holding, the court found that the plaintiffs had shown a sufficient privacy
injury to have Article III standing.120 The court rejected two of three of the
114. U.S. Firms to Spend Nearly $19.2 Billion on Third-Party Audience Data
& Data- Use Solutions in 2018, Up 17.5% From 2017, IAB. (Dec. 5, 2018),
https://www.iab.com/news/2018-state-of-data-report/ [https://perma.cc/KW3M-
N5XF]. 
115. See generally Naylor, supra note 111.
116. See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You




118. Facebook ‘to Be Fined $5bn over the Cambridge Analytica Scandal’, 
BBC NEWS (July 13, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
48972327 [https://perma.cc/J3KS-A922]. The Federal Trade Commission
“[p]rotect[s] consumers and competition by preventing anticompetitive,
deceptive, and unfair business practices through law enforcement, advocacy, and 
education without unduly burdening legitimate business activity.” About Us, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc [https://perma.cc/3252-F23W] 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2020).
119. Joel Rosenblatt, Facebook Faces Massive Damages in Cambridge 
Analytica Suit, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2019-09-09/facebook-users-gain-leverage-in-cambridge-analytica-
privacy-suit [https://perma.cc/2STQ-Q9GW].
120. In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., No. 18-md-
02843-VC, slip op. at 13–18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2019) (Pretrial Order No. 20:
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint).
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plaintiffs’ arguments for relief, including the plaintiffs’ allegation of a loss
of value the users could have derived from exploitation of their own data
and a risk of damage from identity theft.121 However, according to the
court, an intangible privacy harm can certainly be—and in fact was—a 
cognizable injury in federal court under the facts alleged.122 Facebook may
ultimately be exposed to significant damages in the numerous cases filed
after the scandal if other courts follow the Northern District of California’s
reasoning.123 
Sales and misuse of consumer data, such as the Facebook Cambridge
Analytica Scandal, are neither the only risks that consumers face with
corporate data use nor the only ways in which their data is compromised.124 
Cyberattacks by hackers and other cybercriminals resulting in data 
breaches are on the rise.125 Hackers may seek technological weaknesses to
exploit in retailers that store customer data or “second-party data sources”
that aggregate and store consumer data for a purpose separate from retail,
such as a government agency.126 The massive Equifax data breach, which 
exposed the personal data of 147 million consumers, is a prime example
of a second-party data breach.127 Unfortunately, the Equifax breach is 
merely one of a multitude of data breaches that occur each year.128 
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Rosenblatt, supra note 119.
124. Consumer Data under Attack: The Growing Threat of Cyber Crime, 
DELOITTE. (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/tr/en/pages/risk/articles/consumer-
data-under-attack.html [https://perma.cc/QUH6-4UXY].
125. See Juliana De Groot, The History of Data Breaches, DIGITAL GUARDIAN
(Oct. 5, 2020), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-data-breaches [https://
perma.cc/N7B5-S6KP] (discussing trends in the number and scope of data
breaches).
126. See Nicole Martin, What is a Data Breach?, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolemartin1/2019/02/25/what-is-a-data-breach/#
e1ac14514bbe [https://perma.cc/9CWT-7WN8].
127. The Equifax data breach occurred in 2017 and exposed the data of
approximately 147 million people, including social security numbers, birth dates,
addresses, and driver’s license numbers. Equifax was forced to pay $700 million in 
fines to consumers who were affected by the breach. See Alvaro Puig, Equifax Data
Breach Settlement: What You Should Know, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 22, 2019),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2019/07/equifax-data-breach-settlement-what-
you-should-know [https://perma.cc/B6CL-RSRC].
128. Davey Winder, Data Breaches Expose 4.1 Billion Records In First Six 
Months Of 2019, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2019, 06:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/daveywinder/2019/08/20/data-breaches-expose-41-billion-records-in-first-
six-months-of-2019/#21cb1d22bd54 [https://perma.cc/K7BE-BQX9].
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966 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Consumers face potential injury, and corporations may face liability after
data breaches and other failures in data protection.129 The extent of each,
however, may depend on the data protection regulations of the relevant
nation.130 
II. GLOBAL AND U.S. RESPONSE
In light of the risks that data sales, transfers, and breaches pose to
consumers’ privacy interests, nations across the world have begun to
regulate the protection of consumer data.131 Countries have enacted
various regulations that focus on achieving data privacy goals, such as
allowing consumers access to their data and adopting regulations
governing corporations’ use of consumer data.132 Comparatively, the state 
of data protection in the United States is significantly less developed than 
in the European Union.133 Additionally, data protection regimes vary
among the states in the United States.134 
A. Data Privacy and Protection in the European Union
The European Union recently enacted a uniform data privacy
regulation that grants consumers considerable rights regarding their
data.135 The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) took effect
in May 2018 and builds upon the foundation of “the Directive,” its 
previous data regulation scheme.136 The GDPR, however, includes more
detailed practices that companies must follow to protect consumer data,
significantly increased fines for non-compliance, and an expanded
jurisdictional provision that will allow the regulation to affect most U.S.
129. Marty Puranik, What is the Cost of a Data Breach?, FORBES (Dec. 2, 
2019, 08:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/12/02/
what-is-the-cost-of-a-data-breach/#1612f45429e7 [https://perma.cc/WJ3N-FUAU].
130. Justin Pierce, Shifting Data Breach Liability: A Congressional Approach, 
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 975, 985 (2016).
131. See generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21.
132. See generally id.
133. See generally id.
134. See generally id. at 384–85.
135. See generally id. at 375–81.
136. The Data Protection Directive was in place in the European Union since
1995, and similarly to the GDPR, it gave citizens rights of access and more control
over the data that was collected about them. 6 DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW:
A GUIDE TO CYBERLAW AND DATA PRIVACY LAW § 51.04 (2020).
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9672021] COMMENT
companies that transact business with and collect data on EU citizens.137 
It ultimately serves as a significant step forward in the protection of
consumer data privacy in Europe.138 
1. GDPR
The GDPR’s focus is more proactive than prior regulations because it
mandates specific rules and safeguards for protecting consumers’ data that
companies must implement in their data processing operations.139 Under
the regulation, consumers’ “personal data” is data that identifies or is
capable of identifying the consumer.140 “Data processing” includes 
activities such as the collection, storage, and use of data.141 Additionally, 
part of the significance of the new GDPR is its penalty structure that allows
the pertinent regulatory body of each EU member to fine violating
companies up to 4% of revenue.142 For companies like Facebook, which
had a 2018 revenue of over $55 billion, the fine structure could potentially
be in excess of $2 billion.143 
Perhaps the most significant concern with the GDPR is that many U.S.
companies will need to comply with the regulation, as it applies to all
entities processing EU residents’ data, even if the entities are not EU
corporations.144 The broad applicability of the regulation means that U.S.
companies may face compliance or fines if their operations bring them
137. The GDPR purports to apply to all entities which process European Union
citizens’ data. Specifically, article III of the GDPR applies to U.S. companies who
collect the data of EU citizens in marketing or sales, or who collect behavioral 
information such as with cookies. Alexander Torpey & Emily Carter, GDPR
Compliance for US Companies, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 5, 2019), https://www.lexology
.com/library/detail.aspx?g=28f3e303-b454-4b5a-935c-5f96bc60b89e [https://per
ma.cc/9M8Q-BZTY]. Thus, U.S. companies in e-commerce that collect EU
citizens’ data and meet other requirements may be subject to compliance with the
GDPR. BENDER, supra note 136, § 51.04.
138. See generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 375–81.
139. 6 BENDER, supra note 136, § 51.04.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Kate Fazzini, Europe’s Huge Privacy Fines against Marriott and British
Airways Are a Warning for Google and Facebook, CNBC (July 10, 2019, 11:53
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/10/gdpr-fines-vs-marriott-british-air-are-a-
warning-for-google-facebook.html [https://perma.cc/Z8FB-DHFD]. 
143. Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Jan. 31, 2019), available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680119000009/fb-12
312018x10k.htm [https://perma.cc/8NQZ-EJJK].
144. 6 BENDER, supra note 136, § 51.04.
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968 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
within the GDPR’s scope.145 Since the GDPR took effect, the United 
Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Office (UK ICO) has levied
massive fines against U.S. companies.146 For instance, the UK ICO fined 
American hotel chain Marriott $123 million after a breach compromised
one of the company’s databases, exposing the data of 339 million
guests.147 Fines may potentially be levied against major U.S. tech
companies like Google and Facebook as well, which are already under
investigation.148 Facebook, in particular, was already penalized for the
Cambridge Analytica scandal, but it is also under investigation for a
breach of users’ usernames and passwords on Instagram and Facebook.149 
Unlike the relatively weak consumer data protection in the United States,
companies transacting business in the EU and subject to the GDPR are
forced to comply with this strong data protection regulation to avoid
significant penalties.150 
2. Origins of Data Privacy in Europe
The strong protection of consumer data privacy in the EU as a 
“fundamental right” evident in the GDPR stems in part from historical
events that occurred in the European Union.151 Commentators have argued
145. Id.
146. See Fazzini, supra note 142.
147. It is worth noting that although the GDPR allows a maximum fine of 4%
of revenue, this fine was only 1.5% of Marriott’s revenue. See id.
148. The U.K.’s Information Commissioner’s Office, responsible for
enforcing the provisions of the GDPR in the country, is investigating Google for
leaking consumer data relating to its advertising platform. Google was already
fined 50 million euros (roughly $57 million) in January 2019 for not properly
disclosing how data was being used in advertising. Id.; see also, Adam Santariano,
Google Is Fined $57 Million Under Europe’s Data Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/technology/google-europe-
gdpr-fine.html [https://perma.cc/U2V3-NXRN].
149. See Fazzini, supra note 142.
150. See generally Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 389–90.
151. See generally id. at 372–73; see also Council Directive 2016/680, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of
Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Competent 
Authorities for the Purposes of the Prevention, Investigation, Detection or
Prosecution of Criminal Offences or the Execution of Criminal Penalties, and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Council Framework Decision
2008/977/JHA, 2016 O.J. (L 119) (recognizing the protection of personal data in
data processing is a fundamental right of natural persons); Gregory Voss &
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this status as a fundamental right has its origin in major historical events 
in Europe, such as World War II, in which Nazis and others misused
personal data to oppress individuals.152 Importantly, this history caused
European countries to enact broad regulation of data privacy as far back
as 1995, with the EU Data Protection Directive, which gave consumers
many rights regarding their data.153 
The strong protection of data privacy also arguably stems from
European countries’ treatment of a general right to privacy as a personality
right.154 A personality right does not constitute the traditional assets or
property of a person.155 Instead, a personality right “function[s] as a
metaphor for the non-bodily aspects of the personality” and is used to
legally protect personality interests.156 Privacy, dignity, and autonomy are 
aspects of the person that are protected under personality rights.157 
Personality rights are protected under the law of delicts, otherwise known
in the United States as torts.158 Such rights are non-patrimonial,159 
inalienable, and not heritable.160 This treatment of data as a personality
right removes data from the realm of property and places it where a
consumer cannot divest their right to privacy.161 Further, Europe’s right to
publicity is a “hybrid” right, which incorporates patrimonial property
Kimberly A. Houser, Personal Data and the GDPR: Providing a Competitive 
Advantage for U.S. Companies, 56 AM. BUS. L. J. 287, 291 (2019).
152. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 372–73 (discussing the use of records 
in oppression in the post war period).
153. Id. at 373–75 (describing the directive and noting a right to access, a 
requirement for adequate protection and consent, and a right to collect or delete
personal data).
154. See generally id. at 372–73.
155. NIALL R WHITTY & REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, RIGHTS OF PERSONALITY




159. A person’s patrimony is generally considered to be the sum of the
person’s assets and liabilities, or what otherwise may be considered their net
worth. See Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Some Fundamentals of Trusts: Ownership or
Equity in Louisiana?, 92 TUL. L. REV. 53, 67–68 (2017).
160. WHITTY & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 155.
161. Umberto Bacchi, Lack of Rules Leaves Experts Puzzled about Data
Ownership after Death, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2019, 07:04 PM), https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-britain-dataprotection-privacy-analys-idUSKCN1Q304F
[https://perma.cc/2MKW-G7P8] (discussing ownership of data relative to various
nations after death).
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970 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
elements while still protecting the personality of the person.162 Far from a
“personality right,” protection of data privacy in the United States often
leaves consumers without sufficient protection and redress in the event of
a data breach.163 
B. Data Privacy and Protection in the United States
Although the European Union has passed stringent and uniform
regulations like the GDPR to address data privacy and protection issues,
the United States has not passed a comprehensive consumer data privacy
and protection regulation.164 Consumers have struggled to find relief in the
event of a data breach and are left to rely on traditional tort theories of
recovery.165 Statutory protection in the United States is typically in the 
form of either a state data breach notification law or a sector-specific
federal regulation that protects one particular type of data.166 
1. Traditional Federal Regulations
U.S. data protection laws that affect data privacy are a patchwork of
“narrow and sector based” regulations whose protection is limited to a
particular type of data and a particular manner of protection for that data.167 
One example of such sector-specific data privacy regulation is the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), which Congress
specifically enacted to protect information concerning personal health.168 
HIPAA’s main effect on privacy is that it largely prohibits disclosure of
patient health information without consent and gives patients distinct
rights regarding their own health information.169 Another sector-specific 
privacy regulation is the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
162. WHITTY & ZIMMERMANN, supra note 155.
163. Pierce, supra note 130, at 985–88.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Voss & Houser, supra note 151, at 291.
167. Id. at 300–02.
168. Nash, supra note 17, at 215–16.
169. Id. Such other rights include a right to access their health records or
change them. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs
.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html [https://perma
.cc/4WB4-KZ72] (last visited Nov. 13, 2020). Additionally, the regulation seeks
to balance the legitimate needs for information transfer against privacy interests
of individuals. 
352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd  299 4/26/21  8:53 AM











   
 
 
   
    
  




   
 
 
      
 
      
      
    
     
   
   
      
  
    
    
 
          
     




    
9712021] COMMENT
(FERPA).170 FERPA imposes limits on the release of certain students’
records to third parties and creates methods for students and their
guardians to access their educational records.171 FERPA was one of the 
first federal laws passed to address important public privacy concerns.172 
Both HIPAA and FERPA represent typical federal data privacy
regulations in the United States, as they regulate a single area, health
records or student records, respectively, in a very specific manner. Besides
this type of federal regulation, individual states have also provided some
protection for consumer data.173 
2. Traditional State Regulations
All 50 states have enacted laws requiring notification in the event of a 
data breach.174 However, the laws are not uniform and generally do not
prescribe measures that would prevent data protection failures from
occurring in the first place.175 State notification laws vary with respect to
events that trigger the notification requirement, the type of data or
information covered, and the form of notification.176 This lack of
uniformity does not provide U.S. citizens with a consistent standard of data
protection across the country for general consumer data.177 Although the
laws are not uniform, a review of Louisiana’s data breach law is instructive 
of what a data breach notification law generally entails.
170. See The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232(g).
171. 5 JAMES RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 13.04 (2020).
172. Elana Zeide, Student Privacy Principles for the Age of Big Data: Moving
beyond FERPA and FIPPs, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 339, 354 (2016) (online corrected).
173. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 422–24.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Jeff Kosseff, Hamiltonian Cybersecurity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155,
175 (2019). For instance, Utah does not require notification after a breach if it
appears no misuse of the data has or is likely to occur. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-
44-101, § 13-44-202 (West 2020). However, Texas requires disclosure of a breach
if a person’s personal information was reasonably believed to be acquired by an
unauthorized person. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.053 (West 2020).
For a comparison of all states’ data breach notification laws, see FOLEY &




177. See generally Pierce, supra note 130.
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972 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
The Louisiana Legislature passed its notification law, the Louisiana
Database Security Breach Notification Law, in 2005 and amended it most
recently in 2018.178 In doing so, the legislature recognized that the “privacy
and financial security of individuals are increasingly at risk” and aimed to
combat identity theft though the statute.179 The statute protects “personal
information,” which the law specifies as information that contains a
Louisiana resident’s last and first names, social security number, bank
account number, or driver’s license number.180 The most recent
amendment imposes an obligation on persons and legal entities using
Louisiana residents’ data to “maintain reasonable security procedures” to
protect the information, although few specific practices are mandated.181 
Additionally, after a data breach, the data user must notify affected 
residents within 60 days.182 The statute further provides a limited civil
right of action to residents who were injured as a result of the breach to
recover actual damages.183 Interestingly for the analysis of data ownership, 
the Louisiana statute already references the ownership or licensing of
consumer data by the person responsible for notifying the consumer of the
breach.184 
While a step forward for consumers, state data breach notification
laws, like Louisiana’s, are substantially less protective of consumers than
comprehensive data protection regulations like the GDPR.185 The purpose
and application of most notification statutes are focused on reacting to a
data breach, rather than proactively preventing a data breach.186 California,
178. See LA. REV. STAT. § 51:3071–77 (2018); see also Micah J. Fincher &
Jessica C. Engler, One Year Later: Louisiana’s Database Security Breach
Notification Law 2.0, 67 LA. BAR J. 90 (2019).
179. See LA. REV. STAT. § 51:3072.
180. Fincher & Engler, supra note 178, at 90.
181. Id. at 91.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 92.
184. See LA. REV. STAT. § 51:3074. The statute already contemplates that the 
data owner or licensor is the appropriate party to protect the data (“maintain
reasonable security procedures”) and notify consumers in the event of a data
breach. It seems that the legislature, in passing the act, assumed that such
consumer data can have an owner. Id.
185. See generally Gergana Sivrieva, The Equifax Breach Amid a Lawless
Landscape: Changes are Afoot For Privacy & Data Security Due to the European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, 64 WAYNE L. REV. 553, 561–63 
(2019).
186. Id. at 561.
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however, is an exception to the general trend and has passed regulation
beyond a general data breach notification statute.187 
3. The California Consumer Privacy Act: A New Hope in U.S. Data 
Protection
California enacted the strongest state regulation for protecting
consumer data privacy.188 In 2018, California passed the California 
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which became effective on January 1,
2020.189 The CCPA provides consumers with the right to see the 
information collected on them, to deny consent to the transfer of their data,
and to sue those who violate the statute with a limited statutory cause of
action.190 Like the GDPR, the CCPA is designed to protect the data of
California consumers by regulating business’s processing and use of it.191 
The CCPA and GDPR are similar, as each provides consumers with
increased access rights to their data and more control over how companies
may use their data.192 However, there are some major differences between
the two, such as the GDPR’s profit-based calculation of damages, its
requirement of process mapping,193 and its requirement of an impact
assessment.194 Companies around the world that conduct business in
California or collect information from its residents are potentially subject
to the CCPA’s provisions if they meet certain statutorily defined criteria,
187. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–.192 (West 2018) (known as
the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018).
188. See generally Determann, supra note 8, at 24–25.
189. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 403.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 403 n.215.
193. GDPR compliance requires data process mapping, which requires
companies to examine the process of collecting and storing data to ensure they are
compliant with the requirements of the regulation. See Allan Rooney, Effective Data
Mapping and GDPR Compliance, FORBES (Nov. 1, 2018, 01:57 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/entrepreneursorganization/2018/11/01/effective-data-mapp
ing-and-gdpr-compliance/#52ebb6b2421b [https://perma.cc/H526-QTFM]. The
impact analysis is a similar exercise and requires organizations to identify and 
minimize risks associated with data processing.
194. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 404 (noting that the GDPR fine 
structure allows up to 4% of revenue for violators while the CCPA is not as 
stringent; additionally, the GDPR provides for even more proactive assessments
of risk and more controls that must be in place to not be violating the act).
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974 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
such as particular gross revenue requirements.195 Although the CCPA
provides stronger consumer protection, some scholars have argued that the
broad extent of the CCPA may unduly interfere with interstate commerce
in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.196 
No court has decided whether a comprehensive state data protection
regulation like the CCPA violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.197 The
jurisprudence surrounding the Dormant Commerce Clause holds that a
state statute may be invalid if the burden on interstate commerce is
excessive when compared to the local benefits, even if it regulates a valid
local interest.198 In the data context, a court may hold that a patchwork of
state privacy regulations controlling and impeding the flow of data across
state lines is unconstitutional for placing a higher burden on interstate
commerce than necessary to effectuate a state’s interest.199 It is, therefore, 
unclear whether each of the 50 states even have the constitutional ability
to regulate data collection and use in such a manner as the GDPR because 
any state regulation may unconstitutionally interfere with interstate
commerce.200 Such privacy laws would likely regulate conduct occurring
outside of the state, thereby “excessively burden[ing] interstate
commerce,” and creating statutory inconsistencies across the states.201 
Each of these aspects of a broad state data privacy regulation would likely
offend the Dormant Commerce Clause.202 Consequently, the CCPA and 
any similar regulation is subject to a constitutional challenge to its validity
in the future, especially once other states pass comprehensive privacy
195. Companies that collect data from California residents; conduct business
in the state; and that have yearly gross revenues of more than $25 million, sell the
information of 50,000 or more consumers each year, or receive 50% or more of
revenue each year from selling personal information will be subject to the CCPA. 
Stuart D. Levi & Daniel Healow, California Consumer Privacy Act: A
Compliance Guide, SKADDEN, ARPS SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP &
AFFILIATES, https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/03/california-
consumer-privacy-act [https://perma.cc/36FZ-Q9EX] (Mar. 20, 2019).
196. See generally Kosseff, supra note 176, at 178–84 (discussing the
respective power of states and Congress to regulate cyber security, which affects
interstate commerce).
197. See generally id.
198. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
199. Kosseff, supra note 176, at 192–93.
200. See id. at 178–84.
201. Id. at 192–93. While the regulation of interstate commerce is within the 
constitutional powers of Congress, states have some ability to regulate areas that 
may affect commerce among the several states as long as the burden imposed on
interstate commerce by doing so is not too great. Id.
202. Id.
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9752021] COMMENT
regulations that conflict with one another.203 Conflict with the Dormant
Commerce Clause may ultimately limit a state’s ability to legislatively
protect consumers from data breach.
4. Protection in Tort: Foundation, Current State, and Issues
Although data privacy in Europe stems from the protection of privacy
as a “fundamental right,” protection of the right to privacy in the United
States is arguably not as extensive and historic.204 Scholars suggest that
the first real appearance of the right to privacy in the United States was in
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s Harvard Law Review article “The
Right to Privacy.”205 The article discussed how the law of persons and
property inevitably evolved to require protection of one’s solitude and
privacy.206 In cases involving infringement of privacy rights, courts have 
noted that private information is that which is “intended for or restricted
to the use of a particular person or group or class of persons” and not
“freely available to the public.”207 
Although privacy protection in the United States continues to increase,
it is still not as strong as Europe’s non-patrimonial right of privacy.208 
Federal and state courts’ protection of privacy has led many victims of
data breach or misuse to sue for recovery under various privacy torts or a
negligence theory.209 Currently, plaintiffs in the United States may seek
redress for an invasion of privacy under several recognized privacy torts
such as appropriation of name or likeness, intrusion upon seclusion,
publication in a false light, or public disclosure of private facts.210 
However, in the data breach context, there are special issues that may limit
the effectiveness of such a consumer’s tort claim.211 
203. See id. at 178–84.
204. Voss & Houser, supra note 151, at 295–96.
205. Id. (noting that the right to privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution).
206. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 193–95 (1890).
207. U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 763–64 (1989).
208. See generally Voss & Houser, supra note 151, at 296–97.
209. Michael Simpson, All Your Data Are Belong to Us: Consumer Data
Breach Rights and Remedies in an Electronic Exchange Economy, 87 U. COLO.
L. REV. 669, 685 (2016).
210. Bradix v. Advanced Stores Co., 226 So. 3d 523, 530 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 2017).
211. See id. (declining to find standing or an invasion of privacy over an
inability to prove damages in a data disclosure context).
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976 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
In In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California addressed the 
success of a privacy tort claim in the data breach context. 212 There,
Facebook users brought suit over the company’s disclosure of profile data
during the Cambridge Analytica scandal.213 The court found the plaintiffs
had standing on only the privacy claim regarding the general widespread
disclosure of their personal information.214 The court reasoned that a
privacy invasion, here in the form of an unauthorized data sale, could be
an “actual injury” sufficient to confer standing.215 In reaching its
conclusion on the standing issue, the court noted the longstanding
protection of privacy in addition to many other cases where common law
courts allowed claims of injuries allegedly caused by data breaches to 
proceed.216 Nonetheless, the court recognized that courts in other data 
breach cases did not find an actionable privacy injury or standing on their
tort claims.217 Although this particular court found standing on the
plaintiff’s privacy claims, in the absence of any regulation conferring a
right of action, victims of data breach in the United States have faced
significant hurdles to relief in the courts, mainly in the form of standing.218 
In contrast to the In re Facebook court, other federal courts have held
that data breach victims lack Article III standing after reasoning that the
victims’ injuries are not “actual or imminent” because no actual harm from
the breach has occurred yet.219 State courts have also been reluctant to find 
standing in data cases over the harm issue.220 Federal and state judges have
reached such a holding in spite of the supposed general judicial protection
from injury to one’s privacy.221 As scholars have noted, much of a data
breach victim’s protection, or lack thereof, depends upon overcoming this 
212. See discussion supra Part I.C.
213. See generally In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., 
No. 18-md-02843-VC, slip op. at 14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 09, 2019) (Pretrial Order
No. 20: Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint).




218. See generally Sivrieva, supra note 185, at 558–61.
219. Marcus, supra note 15, at 566-69; see also, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 568 U.S. 398, 398 (2016).
220. See Bradix v. Advanced Stores Co., 226 So. 3d 523, 530 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 2017) (declining to find standing or an invasion of privacy over an
inability to prove damages in a data disclosure context).
221. See id.
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9772021] COMMENT
standing hurdle.222 The requirement to prove an injury for standing is 
particularly difficult to show in the data breach context because several
courts require a showing that the hacker or thief actually used the stolen
consumer data and an actual injury already occurred or that such use and
injury is imminent.223 Although the court in In re Facebook found standing
on the privacy claim, a motion to dismiss for lack of standing may defeat
other privacy claims in the data breach context.224 
Even if the court finds that the plaintiff has standing, a case brought
under a negligence tort theory of recovery225 may still fail because of an 
inability to prove damages.226 As part of a general negligence analysis in
tort, one must prove damages.227 Like the standing issue for such a case to
be brought in federal court, courts often require the plaintiff to show
damages in the data breach context beyond the mere unauthorized
disclosure of information.228 Although data breach or misuse impedes a
victim’s control of his data, actual damage, beyond the minimal
impairment of a right, must generally be shown in a traditional negligence
context.229 The requirement of actual harm or damage may limit what is
redressed in a privacy tort context compared to what could potentially be
redressed with property rights and the tort of conversion or trespass.230 
Generally, no tort prevents the dissemination of truthful information
that is not damaging to a person’s reputation because in such a case no
harm has occurred.231 Pure data is not harmful because it is solely a fact or
manifestation of a fact, and until used in a fashion detrimental to the
222. For a federal court to hear a case, the Supreme Court requires a party to
have a “concrete and particularized,” “actual or imminent” “injury in fact” to find
Article III standing. Standing is what the Constitution requires for a person to
bring a claim into, in this case, federal court. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
223. Marcus, supra note 15, at 566–75.
224. See generally Sivrieva, supra note 185, at 558–561.
225. See Bradix, 226 So. 3d at 529 (noting that to prevail under Louisiana’s
duty risk analysis a plaintiff must prove: existence of a duty, breach of that duty,
the breach was cause in fact of the damage, and actual damage).
226. See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 30, at 316, 323.
227. For the duty risk analysis under Louisiana Law, see generally Tyson v.
King, 29 So. 3d 719 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010).
228. See generally id. at 722 (noting that in the duty-risk analysis, actual 
damages must be shown).
229. Simpson, supra note 209, at 685–87.
230. See generally CamSoft Data Sys. v. S. Elecs. Supply, Inc., 2019 CA 0731,
2019 WL 2865359, at *6 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. July 2, 2019).
231. See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625,
639 (3d Cir. 2017).
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978 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
consumer, actual tangible damages have not occurred.232 One further issue 
with tort claims is that they are generally based on the common law torts
of an individual state; thus, the elements of a claim, such as the standard
of care, may differ depending on the forum.233 Although a single
corporation collecting data can operate in multiple states, a consumer may
obtain a different result in a data breach case depending on the forum in
which he sues.234 Thus, tort law does not guarantee a predictable result for
corporations or consumers in the aftermath of a data breach.
Plaintiffs are also unable to contract around the pitfalls of tort to find
relief.235 The modern realities of a technologically-driven society require
consumers to accept privacy agreements for access to increasingly
necessary digital services.236 Essentially, these privacy agreements are 
contracts of adhesion237 that consumers must sign if they want access to 
such services.238 The disparity in bargaining power between a single 
consumer and technological giants, such as Apple, is evident.239 As such,
even though the contract may not be enforceable as a contract of adhesion,
consumers are still unable to effectively bargain for more data privacy
protections.240 The limitations of consumers’ ability to contract around
privacy concerns and the inability to find relief in the courts necessitates a
novel solution.
III. DATA AS AN ITEM OF PROPERTY
While also recognizing business needs for data in light of its
increasing importance, the interests of the consumer in data privacy must
be safeguarded to adequately provide redress following a data breach.241 
The general privacy-based tort approach has not adequately protected
232. See generally Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
233. Kosseff, supra note 176, at 177–78.
234. Id.
235. See generally Anne Logsdon Smith, Alexa, Who Owns My Pillow Talk?
Contracting, Collateralizing, and Monetizing Consumer Privacy Through Voice-
Captured Personal Data, 27 CATH. U. J. L. & TECH. 187 (2018).
236. Id. at 203–07. Such privacy agreements may be present in using a music 
streaming software, setting up an online bank account, or in online shopping.
237. A contract of adhesion is a standard form contract were one party has less
bargaining power than the other. See Aguillard v. Auction Mgmt. Corp., 884 So.
2d 1257, 1259 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004) (discussing jurisprudence and doctrinal
definitions of adhesion contracts).
238. See generally Smith, supra note 235, at 205–08.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See generally Marcus, supra note 15.
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victims of a data breach, and privacy agreements provide little aid to a
consumer who seeks redress under contract.242 Courts and legislatures
should recognize property rights, or quasi-property rights, in data, which
would allow questions involving data protection and breach to be dealt
with more effectively using a property regime.243 Specifically, rights of or
akin to ownership should be created for data, the “raw materials” that
corporations are using to derive information.244 
Currently, whether data is an item of property is unsettled, and much
debate centers on whether data can or should be owned at all.245 To some
extent, consumers believe they should own their data, although they
currently cannot utilize it, and corporations act as though they own
consumer data when they exploit it and structure complex data
transactions.246 If courts are able to apply well-established property
principles on a state-by-state basis, even in the absence of a federal
uniform privacy regulation, they can more effectively deal with data issues
and protect the interests of all involved. When a state or national regulation
is passed, the conception of data as property would provide a useful
foundation for the structure of the regulation.247 To determine whether and
how property rights may be applied to data, this Comment first examines
data’s fit into the traditional notion of property law. Specifically, an
analysis of data’s fit in Louisiana’s civilian property law under the
Louisiana Civil Code serves as guidance.
A. Making “Things” with Clay
The question of whether an individual can own data lies at the core of
an attempt to assign property rights to data.248 Data must be a thing or type
of thing to which property rights can attach for a property-based approach
to apply.249 Property in civilian legal doctrine is traditionally considered a 
“thing” or a right to a thing.250 Under Louisiana law, if data is a “thing” to
242. See generally id. at 581–82.
243. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12.
244. See generally id.
245. See generally SHAPIRO & ANEJA, supra note 105.
246. Id. 
247. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12.
248. See generally Determann, supra note 8, at 4.
249. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at 223 (arguing that data is
a thing and for a property-based approach to data transactions).
250. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 448 (2018). Although the titles of articles are not
the law, this article concerns the division of things in Book 2 of the Civil Code,
on things and the different modifications of ownership.
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980 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
which property rights are assigned, Book 2 of the Louisiana Civil Code
titled “Things and the Different Modifications of Ownership” must govern
it.251 Under the Civil Code, things are classified based on who may own
them, their corporeality, and their movability.252 
1. Data: A Corporeal Movable
The Louisiana Civil Code divides things into several categories,
including immovables and movables and corporeals and incorporeals.253 
Data’s fit in the aforementioned categories will determine if data falls into
a recognized category of property and thus is amenable to the application
of property principles.254 In general, land and its component parts are
immovables, and every other type of property, such as phones, cars, and
other personal property, is a movable.255 If legal scholars, judges, and 
legislators are to classify data as either type, it must be a movable because
it is not land. Beyond that initial classification, corporeal things are those
that are tangible.256 In contrast, incorporeals are things that are
“comprehended by the understanding” and include rights, such as
ownership, to things including both movable and immovable property.257 
Accordingly, if “rights, obligations and actions” are granted over a 
movable thing, they are incorporeal movables, and they are incorporeal
immovables if granted over an immovable.258 Consumer data is not a
“right, obligation, or action” on land so it may not be an incorporeal
immovable.259 Although data does not have “a body” that one can touch in 
the traditional sense contemplated for a corporeal thing, there is Louisiana
jurisprudence suggesting that data could be corporeal.260 
251. LA. CIV. CODE art. 448–76 (2019) (Book II, Title 1, entitled “Things”).
252. Id. art. 448. These divisions are the main distinctions between the types




255. Id. art. 462; id. art. 471; id. art. 475.
256. Id. art. 461. Tangibility itself is often the distinction outside of Louisiana
where the concept of corporeality is not used. In the common law, tangible items
may be the subject of an action for conversion or intangible items that are merged
with a document. 7 STUART SPEISER ET AL. AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 24:6
(2020), Westlaw AMLOT.
257. Id. art. 461.
258. Id. art. 740; id. art. 473.
259. Id. art. 740; id. art. 473.
260. Id. art. 461.
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9812021] COMMENT
In South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Barthelemey, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that software was a corporeal movable for purposes
of a sales and use tax imposed on “tangible personal property.”261 In
deciding the case, the court noted that scholars such as Planiol 262 typically
distinguished between incorporeals as rights and corporeals as physical
objects.263 Due to this distinction, the court reasoned that the recordings of
software at issue are not rights “to be comprehended by the understanding”
but are things that existed in the physical world.264 The court further noted
that as software became a more frequent focus of legal disputes, judicial
understanding increased and judicial attitudes shifted across the country
toward holding software to be tangible.265 
Like the software at issue in South Central Bell Telephone, data is
“physically manifested in machine readable form” using electrical
input.266 Additionally, like the software, data is not solely incorporeal
knowledge.267 Data is knowledge “recorded in a physical form which has
physical existence” and “can be perceived by the senses.”268 It is less like
a right or idea than a recorded “arrangement of matter” and should thus be
classified as corporeal.269 Additionally, electronic data must be stored 
somewhere; therefore, it is intertwined with other corporeal technological
elements.270 Just as software may have property rights affecting it, such as
a copyright, without the software itself being a right, so should rights be 
allowed in data, primarily a right of ownership or quasi-ownership.271 
Although South Central Bell Telephone supports the idea that data can
be classified as an item of property, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal declined to extend the Louisiana Supreme Court’s reasoning in
261. See S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Barthelemy, 643 So. 2d 1240 (La. 1994).
262. Planiol was a well-respected professor and scholar of the 19th and early
20th century whose Civil Law Treatise is heavily relied upon in interpretations of
Louisiana law. See generally 1 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT, TREATISE
ON THE CIVIL LAW, 13–23 (12th ed. 1939).
263. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 643 So. 2d at 1244.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1245.
266. Id. at 1246.
267. See generally id.
268. See generally id.
269. See generally id.
270. See generally id. at 1248.
271. “Quasi-ownership” in this sense refers to similar rights that would
accompany an owner of a thing, even if the item at issue may not fit perfectly with
traditional conceptions of property. It essentially is an attempt to assign rights of
ownership without necessarily resolving completely the issue of whether the item
fits into the traditional categories of property. See generally id. at 1248–49.
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982 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
South Central to CamSoft Data Systems v. Southern Electric Supply, Inc.
in 2019. 272 In CamSoft, the plaintiff sued for the appropriation of business
plans, pricing information, and other information from its business under
the tort of conversion, which provides owners with a remedy for unlawful
interference with a movable.273 Ultimately, the court declined to “extend 
the tort of conversion to immovable, intangible information.”274 In so
holding, the court noted the result in South Central Bell Telephone but
focused purely on the Supreme Court’s analysis of the physicality of the
recording of software in that case.275 The court ultimately did not allow a 
claim for conversion of the information, including some data, due to its
focus on the physicality of the information, the lack of any evidence that
the defendants stole the information in a physical form, and the continued
ability of the plaintiff to use the information after the misappropriation.276 
The Camsoft holding, however, does not focus on the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the nature of software as digital information, which is far more
similar to data than the information allegedly converted in the case.277 
Additionally, the First Circuit’s categorization of the information was in
error, as an “immovable, intangible” thing would be an incorporeal
immovable, which the Civil Code defines as a right to immovable
property.278 From the facts reported in the case, this characterization is not
an appropriate classification under the Civil Code.279 For these reasons, 
South Central Bell Telephone and not Camsoft should govern a
consideration of data as property and supports data’s characterization as
such. Once data may be classified as a thing of property, the next obstacle
to a property-based data regime , particularly under Louisiana law, centers
on who may own the data. The Louisiana Civil Code’s distinction between
private, common, and public things answers the question of who may own
a thing.280 
272. See generally CamSoft Data Sys. v. S. Elecs. Supply, Inc., 2019 CA 0731,
2019 WL 2865359 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. July 2, 2019).
273. Id. at *7.
274. Id.
275. Id. at *8 n.3.
276. Id.
277. See generally id.
278. LA. CIV. CODE art. 470 (2018).
279. Id.; id. art. 473.
280. See id. art. 448.
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9832021] COMMENT
2. Who May Own the Data?
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that a thing must be either a public
thing, a private thing, or a common thing.281 The state or its political
subdivisions own public things in their public capacity, and such things
include public roads and the seashore.282 Civil Code article 453 states that
private things are owned by those other than the state or its subdivisions,
or by the state or its political subdivisions “in their capacity as private
persons.”283 Private things are susceptible of ownership, and they are
generally what a lay person would consider as “property,” such as vehicles
and buildings.284 Finally, common things are those which “may not be
owned by anyone” such as “the high seas.”285 Accordingly, persons may 
freely use common things in conjunction with nature’s intended use.286 
Common things may be susceptible of ownership when removed from the
commons.287 Although the entire high seas are not capable of ownership, 
removing a gallon of water or a container of air for a person’s reasonable
use may reduce that captured subset of the thing to possession and
ultimately ownership by occupancy.288 Data may be considered public, 
private, or common; in particular, the idea of “the commons” or common
things may have much relevance to data.
Data may be analyzed as a public, private, or common thing.289 
Because public things are “owned by the state or its political
subdivisions,” a private company’s data or an individual’s data cannot be
classified as a public thing.290 However, voter information or other data a 
state actor holds in its public capacity that is generally available to the
public may fall under the public category.291 Data that individuals or legal
entities such as corporations “own” may also be classified as a private
281. Id.
282. Id. art. 450.
283. Id. art. 453.
284. Id. These things may include cars, cell phones, and any other number of
items that the reader may own or possess. Id.
285. Id. art. 449.
286. Id.
287. See generally Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805) (discussion of
ownership by occupancy of a fox, once held in the commons, that had been killed.)
288. Id. art. 3412; id. art. 3413 (which notes that animals may be owned in
public by the state or may not have an owner, which would be in the commons
like in Pierson).
289. See generally id. art. 448.
290. Id. art. 450.
291. Id.; see Find Voter or Parish Specific Information, LA. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://voterportal.sos.la.gov [https://perma.cc/PMU6-GXZ7].
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984 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
thing.292 Under a property regime for protecting consumer data, much of
the data that corporations hold may be a private thing once captured.293 
Additionally, some types of data can be a common thing at various
points in the generation and life of the data.294 “The commons” is described
as neither private nor public in a general sense and also in the distinction
between types of property in the Louisiana Civil Code.295 A key attribute 
of a thing in the commons is that it cannot be put on a market to obtain its
“exchange value,” or the value it may be worth in a transaction.296 The
commons is recognized for the community interest, like the recognition of
the high seas as available for all to use.297 Specifically in the context of
intellectual property law, information is generally not protected when it is
found to be in the commons or otherwise in the public domain.298 Privacy
may also yield to the commons.299 For instance, in criminal law, it is not a
search or an invasion of privacy when an officer observes evidence of a
crime in a public place where he is allowed to be.300 Like constitutional
privacy rights, data privacy may necessarily yield if data exists as part of
the commons. For example, a data point which details a GPS location in a
public park is seemingly describing information that was in the
commons.301 Someone may legitimately follow a subject and observe their
location in the park, and the person would have no expectation that that
“data point” may be a secret.302 Although an oversimplification, in such
292. See generally id. art. 453.
293. See generally id. In this context, data is captured when it is recorded in a 
tangible medium.
294. See generally id. art. 452.
295. See generally FRITJOF CAPRA & UGO MATTEI, THE ECOLOGY OF LAW:
TOWARD A LEGAL SYSTEM IN TUNE WITH NATURE AND COMMUNITY 149 (2015).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991)
(noting that facts are part of the public domain available to every person and may
not be copyrighted).
299. See generally Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
300. See generally id. (holding that a fly-over by police in helicopter was not
a search where the helicopter followed aviation guidelines and was where it was 
allowed to be in the airspace).
301. If a person records the fact independently, such as when a person happens
to be in another’s photograph, there is seemingly no claim that the photographer
has taken something that is theirs. The fact is something for all to perceive as they
move through their daily life. See, e.g., CAPRA & MATTEI, supra note 295.
302. Obviously, this poses problems of criminal activity, stalking and the like.
However, it does illustrate that certain data points, at certain times, should be
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9852021] COMMENT
case, it may be said that they have effectively released it to the public
domain.303 
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the California
Supreme Court’s finding that any property rights a blood donor held over
the sample that he relinquished can approximate this idea of a release of
property into the commons.304 The court held that a patient had no 
protectable property interest in samples of blood that researchers used
without his knowledge to create extremely valuable cell lines for treating
leukemia.305 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted the patient’s lack
of expectation of a retention of ownership interest in his blood after the
researchers drew the samples.306 Although Moore is a case from
California, under Louisiana Law the sample in Moore could properly be
classified as abandoned because the patient did not intend to own it any
further.307 Additionally, under the law of occupancy,308 one who takes
possession of a corporeal movable that no one owns acquires ownership
upon taking possession.309 Thus, if data is a corporeal movable as
discussed above, it is susceptible, if unowned at some point, to being
acquired by occupancy.310 
Ultimately, data is susceptible to categorization under Louisiana’s
property law scheme and potentially in the property regimes of other
states.311 Although data may fall within a well-defined category of
property, it is worth considering whether property rights should be allowed 
in data at all. Indeed, data does not engender the same policy
considerations of promoting creativity and invention that prompted 
property rights in intellectual property, as data is more like a fact.312 
Additionally, certain elements of data may be in the public domain and
perhaps should not be owned by an individual.313 However, there are
insusceptible of ownership by themselves and outside of the context of
recordation.
303. See generally Riley, 488 U.S. 445.
304. See generally Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.
1990).
305. Id. at 480–81.
306. Id. at 488.
307. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 3418 (2018).
308. Id. art. 3412. “Occupancy is the taking of possession of a corporeal
movable that does not belong to anyone. The occupant acquires ownership the
moment he takes possession.” Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See discussion supra Part III.
312. See generally Determann, supra note 8, at 25–26.
313. See generally id. at 38–39.
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986 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
considerations that affect and support the application of property
principles and rights to data.
B. Should Property Rights in Data Be Allowed? 
Although data can fit into a property regime, the question remains as
to whether it should. Property rights are flexible, and the law provides
remedies for the impairment of a property right when other areas of the
law may not.314 Property enjoys strong protection and has evolved to
reflect social determinations about the balances between competing
parties’ rights.315 Although data misuse implicates privacy, which has 
traditionally been redressed in tort, U.S. courts have largely been unable
or unwilling to protect the individual associated with the data after a
breach for issues such as standing and damages.316 For whomever would
possess the property rights to data, data property rights would theoretically
alleviate the standing issue in the event of a breach, as the cognizable
injury would be the impairment of one or more of a data holder’s well-
established bundle of rights.317 Furthermore, a property regime may allow
new theories of recovery for plaintiffs to bring claims under existing
property-based torts such as conversion or trespass. 
Failure to treat data as property ignores the reality of data itself and 
how businesses in the information-based economy function.318 According 
to Justice Holmes in International News Service, property rights do not
necessarily arise from the fact that a thing has value, but from the need for
other rights, such as the right to exclude others from the thing or to be free
from interference in the thing.319 Companies already act to exclude others 
from the data they have collected through firewalls and other security
measures.320 Once businesses collect consumer data they should
314. See generally Lipton, supra note 46.
315. See generally id. at 160–67 (discussing the balancing of rights in
intellectual property and how a similar balance could be made in information
property rights more broadly).
316. For an example, see Bradix v. Advanced Stores Co., 226 So. 3d 523, 529
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2017).
317. In the tort of conversion, the interference with the ownership or
possessory rights of a corporeal moveable is grounds for the action. See CamSoft 
Data Sys. v. S. Elecs. Supply, Inc., 2019 CA 0731, 2019 WL 2865359, at *6–7 
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. July 2, 2019).
318. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12.
319. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918).
320. Bianca Male, 10 Essential Data-Security Measures Every Business
Should Take, BUS. INSIDER (June 8, 2010, 10:08 AM), https://www.business
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9872021] COMMENT
reasonably protect that data, regardless of who owns it, because it contains
private information that may cause harm in the wrong hands.321 Collected
consumer data is not open to the public domain at that point, and if a hacker
appropriates this stored data, he may have criminal charges brought
against him.322 If property rights arise from such needs as the right to
exclude as Holmes posited, it appears data is already being treated in a
similar manner—as if it were owned—and it should merit similar property
rights.323 Holders of consumer data may restrict access to consumer data
to outsiders, and are even expected to do so under regulations like the
GDPR.324 The owner or holder of property interests in data should have
some version of a right to exclude and other property rights to protect their
own efforts and to protect consumers from others’ misuse.325 
Furthermore, the flexibility of property rights, which allows courts and
legislatures to modify and limit them for societal balances, supports the
application of property rights to data.326 Although data is a poor fit with 
and generally excluded from protection under current U.S. intellectual
property law, intellectual property law is illustrative of the nuanced
balancing between the competing interests that property may seek to
protect.327 Intellectual property seeks to encourage invention and creativity 
by balancing the promotion of information in the public domain to keep
open the building blocks of such innovation, while also providing limited
monopolies to incentivize creation.328 A similar balance between the 
interests of consumers and companies in data may be struck in property
law.329 As property rights are not absolute, the judiciary or legislature
insider.com/10-essential-data-security-measures-every-business-should-take-2010
-6 [https://perma.cc/Z2DC-NVCZ].
321. Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Oct. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance
/protecting-personal-information-guide-business.
322. Sinead Baker, A Russian Man Pleaded Guilty over One of the Biggest-
Ever Hacks, Where 100 Million People’s Data Was Stolen from US Companies 
Like JPMorgan Chase, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2019, 07:33 AM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/andrei-tyurin-russian-pleaded-guilty-hacking-us-firm
s-jpmorgan-chase-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/X6UX-LBYX].
323. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12.
324. See generally id.; see also 6 BENDER, supra note 136.
325. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at 222–23.
326. See generally Lipton, supra note 46 (discussing the application of some
traditional property principles to information property in general).
327. See generally id. at 153–65 (for a discussion of the balancing of interests
in “fair use” of copyright).
328. See generally id.
329. See generally id.
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988 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
could fashion a workable solution to balance competing interests in
data.330 Though many different property principles, such as licensing, may
apply to data depending on how it is categorized and to whom property
interests are assigned, assigning property interests will allow courts to
more clearly decide cases and provide consumers and businesses with
clearer expectations in the use of data.331 
Based on the properties of data, data’s ability to be defined with
familiar property classifications, its value, the economic realities of
modern data, and the need for traditional property rights in data such as
the right to exclude, property rights or quasi-property rights should be 
assigned to data, if not true ownership.332 Well-settled property principles
are helpful to determine what property interests may apply and to whom
they will be granted.333 
IV. FROM CLAY TO CRUDE
As technology changes and society evolves, new things are created
that may be classified as property. Other scholars have found comparisons
between new things and well-established property law to be instructive in 
determining how to treat these new items of property.334 Therefore, an 
approach derived from the rule of capture found across the country in the 
area of mineral rights may be illustrative of how property principles could
be applied to data. The history of the rule of capture and its role in general
property law are fundamental to understanding the rule and how it can
apply to data. 
A. Whose Oil Is It Anyway?
The rule of capture was initially a common law rule developed in the
1800s out of the need to address a timely and unique problem—the drilling 
of oil wells.335 The rule gradually evolved in state courts after the first oil
well was drilled in Pennsylvania in 1859.336 Under the rule of capture, a 
party with the right to explore for minerals on a tract of land, whether
through ownership or another mineral right such as a mineral servitude,
330. See generally id. at 135.
331. See generally id.
332. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12.
333. See generally Lipton, supra note 46.
334. See generally id.
335. See Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture – An 
Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENV’T L. 899, 900 (2005).
336. See id.
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9892021] COMMENT
takes ownership of the oil and gas when it is reduced to possession.337 The 
lawful possessor then becomes the owner of that oil and gas once produced
from his well and reduced to possession, even if it migrated from under
the land of another.338 Courts developed the rule because of the difficulty
of determining whose subsurface the oil and gas actually came from.339 
The difficulty occurs because oil and gas are fugitive and may migrate 
from the land under which they originally resided.340 For policy reasons,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, if landowners had a property
interest in individual molecules of oil and gas beneath their land and could
bring an action for trespass or conversion of those molecules when others
reduced them to possession through a lawfully drilled well on neighboring
property.341 Additionally, courts adopting the rule of capture intended to 
promote the exploitation of oil and gas by rewarding those who were
actively trying to produce it.342 Historically, the only remedy for the party
who could not claim production from a well on another’s property was to
drill an offset well of one’s own to capture as much oil as possible from
the common reservoir.343 Ultimately, this “self-help” remedy of offset
drilling led to waste and inefficiency in production from a single pool.344 
Because of this, states created conservation statutes that were designed to 
reduce waste and to efficiently protect the mineral supply.345 These
regulations provided for pooled or unitized drilling, area restrictions, and
other methods to control production.346 
Although most states recognize the rule of capture in the oil and gas 
context, a divide exists among states on whether fugitive minerals, such as
oil and gas, can be owned “in place” with the land while still in the
337. See generally Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399 (Ohio 1897) (an early
case discussing the rule of capture); see also LA. MIN. CODE art. 8 (2019).
“Minerals are reduced to possession when they are under physical control that
permits delivery to another.” Id. art. 7.
338. See generally Kelley, 49 N.E. 399; see also id. art. 8.
339. See Kramer & Anderson, supra note 335, at 906.
340. See id.
341. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561–62 (Tex. 1948).
342. See generally id.
343. See generally Barnard v. Monongahela Nat. Gas Co., 65 A. 801 (Pa.
1907).
344. Elliff, 210 S.W. 2d at 562.
345. Id. (noting that the Railroad Commission promulgated conservation
statutes for well spacing, which while protecting the general interest, allow
fairness in each getting his share of the oil and gas in the reservoir).
346. Id.
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990 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
ground.347 Ownership-in-place states, like Texas, dictate that the owner of
the land owns the oil and gas under the ground as part of the land before it
migrates to another property, provided there is no outstanding mineral
interest.348 Other states, like Louisiana, provide that fugitive minerals such 
as oil and gas belong to no one while they are still in the ground and are 
only owned once they are reduced to possession.349 Louisiana Mineral
Code article 6 codifies this initial lack of ownership and is similar to the
law of occupancy.350 In these non-ownership-in-place states, a landowner
of a parcel with no outstanding mineral interest has the right to explore for
and produce the minerals, although he does not own them in place.351 Both 
types of states still recognize the rule of capture because of the
aforementioned logistical problems associated with determining from
under whose property the extracted oil originated.352 
The rule of capture’s result—that the one who captures the minerals
owns them—may seem unfair to a landowner with an interest in the
exploration of or the ownership of the minerals under his land.353 However,
the landowner whose land is drained is not without a remedy in all cases.354 
Besides the self-help remedy of offset wells, a doctrine of “correlative
rights” is often recognized judicially and even by statute in Louisiana. The
doctrine of correlative rights provides that one exercising his mineral right
must exercise it with “reasonable regard” for the rights of the landowner
and surrounding owners.355 This doctrine both limits the property rights of
the producer and protects the rights of others with an interest in the
minerals.356 Courts have held that if a producer acts unreasonably in his
347. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 7 (2019) (noting that although the landowner has
the right to search for fugitive minerals such as oil and gas, ownership of the land
does not include ownership of those minerals).
348. Texas is an ownership-in-place state. See Elliff, 210 S.W. 2d at 582.
349. See id. art. 6; id. art. 7 (noting what constitutes possession).
350. See id. art. 6 (noting that although the landowner has the right to search
for fugitive minerals such as oil and gas, ownership of the land does not include
ownership of those minerals).
351. Id. art. 8 (“A landowner may use and enjoy his property in the most
unlimited manner for the purpose of discovering and producing minerals,
provided it is not prohibited by law.”). This article codifies the ability of an owner
to explore for oil and gas, even though Louisiana is not an ownership-in-place
state.
352. Elliff, 210 S.W. 2d at 582.
353. See generally id.
354. See generally id.
355. LA. MIN. CODE arts. 9, 11.
356. Elliff, 210 S.W. 2d at 583 (noting that the correlative rights in production
among landowners was created due to the distinct nature of oil and gas).
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9912021] COMMENT
production, for example, if he is wasteful or causes a blowout,357 he can
be liable to others for the damage to their interest in the underlying
reservoir.358 In this way, the right to explore is not absolute and cannot be 
exercised without regard for others.359 In Louisiana, restriction on drillers’ 
unbridled use of their property interest is codified in Mineral Code article
10, which provides for liability for a person who “deprive[s] another
intentionally or negligently of the liberty of enjoying his rights” or causes 
him damage.360 Thus, a party’s interests may be protected from another’s
undesirable behavior.
Although found in oil and gas law, the rule of capture has roots in the
law of occupancy and a similar result may also be found in other
contexts.361 For instance, in the Moore case, the scientists obtained 
ownership of the donor’s blood by capturing it and possessing it.362 To use
property law terminology, with no expectation of retention of ownership
in the blood sample, the sample could be said to be abandoned and released
into the commons by the donor.363 By exerting effort, intending to own
them, and further developing the samples, the researchers could then assert
an ownership claim to the ultimate product.364 This is similar to the
producer of oil gaining ownership of the oil once it is extracted and
reduced to possession.365 Additionally, the complexity and amount of
disputes that would arise from patients’ ownership of each medical sample
drawn implicates similar logistical considerations as the ownership of
individual oil molecules.366 Occupancy and the rule of capture in a mineral
rights context are instructive in defining property rights in data for many 
of the same reasons they have been applied in an oil and gas context.
357. A blowout is the “uncontrolled flow of formation fluids from a well” that
“cannot be contained using previously installed barriers” and may consist of
water, oil, natural gas, or a combination of the three. blowout, SCHLUMBERGER |
OILFIELD GLOSSARY (last visited Feb. 2, 2020), https://www.glossary.oilfield
.slb.com/en/Terms/b/blowout.aspx [https://perma.cc/5VZH-2W96].
358. See generally Elliff, 210 S.W. 2d at 558.
359. Id. at 582–84.
360. Id. art. 10.
361. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. See generally Kramer & Anderson, 
supra note 335.
362. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. See generally Moore v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (Cal. 1990).
363. See generally Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 136–37.
364. See generally id. at 142–47.
365. See generally id. at 120.
366. See generally id.
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992 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
B. Drill Baby, Drill!
The rule of capture allows ownership rights to be defined, to be limited
relative to others interests, and to enforce responsibility in the mineral
rights context.367 The rule of capture framework can help scholars, judges, 
and legislators understand how rights in data property should be
delineated, limited, and otherwise protected. Much of the rule of capture
can apply to the new problems attending data property rights by analogy,
just as the rule of capture was developed to deal with the complexities of
property rights after the discovery of oil.368 Similarly to how oil migrates
from parcel to parcel under the subsurface, data appears to move from the
person from which it is derived once it springs into existence and is
recorded. Additionally, the rule of capture is one example of the balancing
of multiple interests in property often undertaken by the judiciary and
legislature.369 As applied to data, the rule of capture may balance both the
interests of consumers and businesses in its application. The first step
under the application of the rule of capture is to define who owns the data
and when. The admittedly uncomfortable result compelled is that the
corporations who are actively collecting the data should own it.370 
1. Data Property Rights Should Be Given to Corporations Capturing It
Like a surface owner’s interest in fugitive minerals in a non-
ownership-in-place state, a consumer should have a protectable interest in
their underlying data.371 Although consumers cannot monetarily exploit
this interest as of yet, as the court in In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer
Privacy User Profile Litigation noted, a person does have a protectable
right to publicity and privacy.372 In the comparison to mineral rights, it is 
arguable whether the data subject should own their data “in-place” or
whether data should not be owned “in-place,” as it may not exist unless
367. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
368. See generally Lipton, supra note 46.
369. See discussion supra Part IV.A. Conservation statutes, correlative rights,
and other measures protect others with interests in the underlying oil and gas.
370. See discussion supra Part IV.A. The rule of capture in an oil and gas
context states that he who produces the oil owns it, and thus he who produces or
collects the data would own it under this regime.
371. See generally Lipton, supra note 46.
372. In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., No. 18-md-
02843-VC, slip op. at 13-18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 09, 2019) (Pretrial Order No. 20:
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint).
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9932021] COMMENT
separate from the person.373 Whatever interest a consumer initially may 
have in his data changes, however, when a company drills the data “well” 
and the personal data starts “flowing.” Assuming a consumer has some 
interest in his data “in-place,” once separated from the person, especially
if consented to in a privacy agreement, a consumer arguably has no
reasonable expectation of ownership once the data is collected in a form
apart from his person.374 This is analogous to the lack of an expectation of
an ownership interest in the blood samples once drawn and effectively
abandoned.375 Alternatively, data, or any interest in data, might be deemed 
only to exist at or shortly before its recordation, separately from the
consumer who cannot exploit its value, even if consumers believe they
have the ownership interest in their data and do not expressly consent to 
its collection.376 
At this point, if the data is effectively abandoned or becomes a new
thing entirely, the data is fugitive, unowned, and susceptible to capture.377 
If the data is abandoned and in the commons, the party who first takes
possession through occupancy could then establish ownership of data,
which we have classified as a corporeal movable.378 Like oil migrating
from underneath an owner’s land to an adjoining well, by using websites
that legally collect data, the data collectors should gain a property interest
in the data that is seemingly abandoned, which they capture or collect.379 
The Louisiana Database Notification Law is even written in terms of the
data collectors as owners or licensees of personal data.380 Although value
of the thing is not dispositive, much money and effort are spent on data
373. This depends on at what point one believes that data is “conceived.” Is it
when it is recorded, or does the data reside within the person before it is recorded
because the data relates to aspects of the person? See generally THE BRITISH
ACADEMY, DATA OWNERSHIP, RIGHTS AND CONTROLS: REACHING A COMMON
UNDERSTANDING (Oct. 3, 2018), https://royalsociety.org/-
/media/policy/projects/data-governance/data-ownership-rights-and-controls-
October-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q2K-3PU6]. Like how the rule of capture
applies to both ownership and non-ownership in place states, it might be applied
to data regardless of the answer to this question. See e.g., Elliff v. Texon Drilling
Co., 210 S.W. 2d 558, 582 (Tex. 1948),
374. See generally Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 136
(Cal. 1990).
375. Id. 
376. See generally id.
377. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3418 (2018).
378. Id. (establishing that “one who takes possession of an abandoned thing
with the intent to own it acquires ownership by occupancy”).
379. Id. 
380. LA. REV. STAT. § 51:3074 (2019).
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994 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
collection.381 Additionally, even though the data is not yet refined into
information, its disclosure could be damaging to consumers, and those
collecting data should have an incentive and right to exclude certain others
and protect it from disclosure.382 Policy considerations regarding value
generation, found also at the core of the rule of capture, support businesses
having the most data property rights.383 
Businesses are generally the only party to the generation of consumer
data that have the ability to derive economic value from the data.384 
Consumers cannot readily extract the value of their data, as there is not a
widely accessible commercial marketplace.385 However, in business
contexts, both through a business’s own use and data transactions, data is
very valuable. 386 This disparity in the value of data based on who owns it
may prompt an application of the principle of relativity of title.387 
Ultimately, organizations may have a better claim to title than the
consumers, considering that a thing may be assigned property rights 
relative to the person in a position to derive value from it.388 
In In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litigation,389 
the court indirectly discussed this concept of relativity of title regarding
data subjects in ruling on Facebook’s motion to dismiss.390 In the case, the
381. Betty Ho, Companies Spend More Than $20b on Data Solutions Each
Year, CRITEO (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.criteo.com/insights/companies-spend-
20b-data-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/E7Z7-J69M].
382. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at 252–254 (noting that
property rights entail corresponding obligations).
383. See generally Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
384. John Akred & Anjali Smani, Your Data Is Worth More Than You Think, 
MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (Jan. 18, 2018), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/
your-data-is-worth-more-than-you-think/ [https://perma.cc/LA8T-TG44].
385. In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., No. 18-md-
02843-VC, slip op. at 13–18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 09, 2019) (Pretrial Order No. 20:
Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint).
386. Alan Mitchell, What Is the Economic Value of Data?, MEDIUM (Feb. 25,
2019), https://medium.com/mydex/what-is-the-economic-value-of-data-ef129e6
485e1 [https://perma.cc/9NCK-WAD5] (discussing how value is derived from
data, although the author does not assign monetary figures to the analysis).
387. Relativity of title contemplates that property rights are not necessarily
absolute, and that the assignment of property rights often varies depending on the
circumstances and parties involved. See generally JOSEPH SINGER ET AL.,
PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 155 (2017).
388. In re Facebook, Inc., slip op. at 13–18.
389. See discussion supra Part I.D.
390. In re Facebook, Inc., slip op. at 13–18.
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9952021] COMMENT
plaintiffs asserted that they lost the economic value of their data and that
had there been no breach, they might have sold the data to brokers or
advertisers themselves to realize that value.391 The court noted that
although Facebook derives value from consumers’ data by providing it to
companies, the once private information did not have “independent
economic value to an individual user” in the absence of the breach.392 
Accordingly, the court dismissed this argument and found no injury for
the consumers.393 The court found the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged
that they could find a buyer or a market for their individual information or
that they intended to sell it.394 
Ultimately, if property rights are to be created at all in data, they
should not be given to consumers who lack the ability to generate
economic value.395 Consistent with the rule of capture, data property rights 
should be granted to the capturer who is in a position to generate economic
value from them.396 Consumers still need protection for their data though,
as they may suffer more and highly personal damage through data misuse
than an adjacent landowner in the mineral rights context. 
2. Protecting the Consumer
Although consumers may desire an absolute ownership interest in
their own data, to grant them such interest may create significant problems
by heavily burdening modern, data-dependent business operations in
lengthy disputes over consumers’ individual data points.397 Problems
associated with consumers owning their own data may sufficiently invoke
the policy considerations of the rule of capture. To assign consumers
property rights in individual data points or in other rule-of-capture
contexts, such as oil or blood molecules, may “open the floodgates of
litigation,” which courts are unfit to deal with currently.398 Conversely, if 
corporations hold property interests in the data, litigation might more
effectively be reduced to the event of a breach or other misuse.399 
Additionally, by placing ownership with the corporations, the burden of





395. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at 267–268.
396. See generally Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
397. See generally Determann, supra note 8.
398. See generally id.
399. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at 267–68.
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996 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
using it.400 Also, at this time it may be more desirable and feasible to place
the obligations of data ownership and transactions, such as taxes and other
burdens, on the corporations aggregating the data, rather than individual
consumers with less financial resources.401 Assigning consumers or data
subjects broad property interests in data would also hinder corporations’
ability to generate value from it, thus limiting the value that the
marketplace could derive.402 However, consumers still need protection,
and the legal principles attendant to the rule of capture can provide
remedies.
Through the creation of correlative rights and conservation statutes in
data equivalent to those created in the law of mineral rights, consumers’
interests in their data can be protected.403 Throughout property law,
property rights—even the greatest of them, ownership—are rarely
absolute.404 Time limits on patents and other intellectual property, building 
codes, and even the doctrine of correlative rights are judicially or
legislatively imposed restrictions on some aspect of an owner’s bundle of
property rights.405 For initial protection for consumers under the data rule
of capture, the application of recovery for waste and the doctrine of
correlative rights can be structured to allow a consumer to bring an action
for negligent or “wasteful” data use, such as allowing a data breach or
selling to an irreputable third party.406 Furthermore, a uniform data
protection and privacy regulation like the GDPR can take the place of the
conservation statutes used to protect a mineral pool.407 Federal and state
legislatures are likely best suited to serve societal interests, create the
aforementioned limits on the data “owner’s” bundle of rights, and provide
well-defined causes of action for injured consumers.408 Such limits may
include a reasonable limitation on alienability, likely necessary in the
personal data context, although generally disfavored in the law,409 or a 
400. See generally Lipton, supra note 46, at 172.
401. See generally id.
402. See generally Determann, supra note 8.
403. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
404. See Lipton, supra note 46.
405. See generally id.
406. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 583–84 (Tex. 1948).
407. See generally Kramer & Anderson, supra note 335, at 952–953.
408. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 264–67 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
409. Although generally disfavored, restraints on alienation may be valid if
reasonable. Particularly in Louisiana, they are upheld if they do not permanently
remove the item from the stream of commerce and do not violate public policy.
As such, it appears a restraint on the sale of data may be reasonable and promote
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9972021] COMMENT
limit on the right to exclude the data subject from accessing their data. In
these ways, the data owner’s right would not be absolute, and consumer
interests would be protected.
Eventually, if Americans demand an ownership interest in their data,
and if other factors, such as the ability to monetize their own data, 
materialize, then perhaps the ownership rights would and should vest in 
consumers.410 In this case, consumers would be able to exert more 
authority in the contractual bargaining process with corporations over
privacy and might effectively resist consent to data collection.411 At such
a point, other property concepts such as licensing would be required to
deal with consumer and corporate data ownership and use.412 If one could 
monetize their data, relativity of title would weigh towards greater
property interests lying with the subjects of the data.413 Over time and with
the help of legislatures and courts, existing property law principles can be
applied to data property in a flexible “quasi-property” manner to
accommodate changes in the balance of consumer and business interests
in consumer data.
CONCLUSION
The modern issues in the United States surrounding data protection
and privacy may be examined and analyzed using old, well-established
legal principles.414 By thinking of data as property, the interests of
consumers and business can be better balanced.415 While recognizing
business necessities, the property rights of the business may still be limited
to protect consumers’ interests in their data.416 Traditionally, U.S. privacy 
law in tort has not been an effective remedy for data breach victims.417 By
applying the rule of capture and the corresponding doctrines of correlative
rights, consumers may have a stronger right of action when their data is
misused.418 To some degree, this solution simply recognizes how
a valuable public policy of consumer protection. See e.g., Mardis v. Brantley, 717
So. 2d 702 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1998).
410. See generally THE BRITISH ACADEMY, supra note 372.
411. Id.
412. See generally Lipton, supra note 46.
413. See discussion supra at Part IV.B.1.
414. See generally Lipton, supra note 46.
415. See generally Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12.
416. See generally id.
417. See generally David Bier, Integrating Integrity: Confronting Data Harms 
in the Administrative Age, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1799 (2019).
418. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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998 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
businesses already operate and how they are treated regarding the data they
collect.419 By recognizing this, however, legislators, courts, and scholars 
can establish a foundation for data protection regulations and a basis for
consumer protection.
Initially, state courts can recognize the application of property
principles and rights to data without the immediate need for legislation.
Applied by the state and due to ownership resting with the data collector,
the property regime may not conflict with the Dormant Commerce
Clause.420 Additionally, this allows courts to draw on well-established and
familiar property principles when dealing with novel data breach issues.421 
One method for applying a data property regime would be to use the rule
of capture to deal with data issues as described in this Comment. As it 
stands, it appears that Louisiana is already well positioned to implement
such property principles through the Louisiana Civil Code and the
legislature’s consideration of data ownership in its Database Security
Breach Notification Law.422 While the judicial utilization of a property
regime in data would provide a workable solution for many issues
regarding data protection and privacy, it would also provide a foundation
for subsequent uniform data protection legislation.423 If, as Justice
Brandeis said, policy decisions regarding societal values of property are
best left to the legislature, then they may be well advised to also rely on a
traditional property-based approach in regulating data when crafting a 
general data protection law.424 The most ideal option for consumers,
however, may be a recognition that data privacy is an extra-patrimonial
right, which may even exceed the protections that a congressional, uniform
data privacy act based in property could afford. Given the United States’
interest in protecting corporations and the prevalence of data in the modern
information-driven economy, this result seems unlikely. In the absence of
broad data privacy regulation in the United States, the interests of
consumers and organizations can be more effectively balanced as the arena
of data protection develops by recognizing that property principles can and
should apply to data, and acknowledging that data is a thing of property.425 
419. Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, 221–23.
420. See generally Kosseff, supra note 176, at 175.
421. See generally Lipton, supra note 46.
422. LA. REV. STAT. § 51:3074 (2019).
423. Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at 221–223.
424. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 264–67 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
425. See generally Lipton, supra note 46; Ritter & Meyer, supra note 12, at
221–23.
